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Abstract 
This paper analyses public support for the euro in Germany. Drawing from the results of 
regular Eurobarometer surveys, it finds that the ongoing financial and sovereign debt crisis 
has reduced support for the euro among German citizens, but not dramatically so – at least 
not yet. In the 1990s, the German public was sceptical towards the euro. But since the 
introduction of euro banknotes and coins, a clear majority of citizens supports the euro – 
despite the financial and sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, on average, support for the euro is 
at a similar level in Germany as it is elsewhere in the euro area. 
This salient finding, however, appears to contradict the results of a survey conducted by the 
Allensbach Institute, an influential public opinion polling centre in Germany, which 
concludes that an overwhelming majority of Germans do not trust the euro any more. 
We suggest that this striking difference in findings could be due to three factors: a) the fact 
that the Allensbach Institute and Eurobarometer were measuring different concepts: trust in 
the euro and support for the euro, respectively; b) the Allensbach Institute’s results might be 
biased, given the scaling of their trust question and c) the fact that Eurobarometer frames its 
survey questions explicitly in a European context, whereas the Allensbach surveys have a 
purely national context.  
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∗ 
here is a widespread belief in Germany (and elsewhere) that German citizens have 
turned against the centrepiece of the process of deeper European integration: the 
euro.1 The Allensbach Institute, a well-known public opinion polling centre, reported 
that levels of trust in the euro started to decline in April 2010 (Köcher, 2010). More recently, 
other studies claim that an overwhelming majority of citizens have lost trust in the euro 
(Köcher, 2011 a & b; Petersen, 2011; Ankenbrand & Siedenbiedel, 2011). Two of these studies, 
utilising data on trust from public opinion polls conducted in May/June 2011 (Ankenbrand 
& Siedenbiedel, 2011) and August 2011 (Köcher, 2011a) assert that trust in the euro has 
reached a dramatically low level, with only 19% trusting the euro compared to 71% who 
mistrust the euro in May/June 2011. By August, these same authors reported that the 
percentage of those not trusting the euro had risen to 76%. Interestingly, however, not all 
surveys reach these same negative findings. For example, one survey conducted by the 
EMNID Institute in mid-2011 (DAPD, 2011) finds that two-thirds of German citizens believe 
that the euro will still be in use in 2021, and only one-third believes that the euro will have 
disappeared in ten years. A study by TNS Infratest in mid-November 2011 (DPA, 2011a) 
reaches the conclusion that 30% of German citizens still trust the euro, 36% still have partial 
trust in the euro and only 33% mistrust the euro. Another study by EMNID in December 
2012 (DPA, 2011b) finds that 51% of German citizen negatively assess the future of the euro, 
whereas 44% positively assess the future of the euro. 
Taking this diverse information from within the German public sphere as a starting point, 
the purpose of this paper is to analyse German citizens’ support for the euro over a 21-year 
period from 1990 to 2011. It uses data from the Eurobarometer surveys conducted on a 
comparable basis in all EU member countries. Using this 21-year time period, this paper will 
first analyse graphically2 the impact of the financial crisis (autumn 2008 – spring 2011) and 
the ongoing sovereign debt crisis (spring 2010 – spring 2011) on support for the euro. 
Eurobarometer surveys cover a broad range of other questions related to trust in the 
European institutions, such as the European Central Bank (ECB), which we have used as the 
empirical basis of several studies showing that trust in the ECB has fallen sharply in the 
aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt crisis.3 As a second step, therefore, this paper 
will compare trends in citizens’ trust in European and national institutions to citizens’ 
                                                      
∗ Daniel Gros is Director of CEPS and Felix Roth is a Research Fellow at CEPS and post-doctoral 
lecturer at the University of Göttingen. They would like to thank Lars Jonung for sharing his dataset 
on aggregated support for the euro (1992-2009) and for useful comments on the paper. Felicitas 
Nowak-Lehmann D. and Steffen Kühnel are gratefully acknowledged for their useful comments, as is 
Raf van Gestel for excellent research assistance. The authors would also like to thank Dr. Thomas 
Petersen from the Allensbach Institute for providing the aggregated trend data on trust in the euro 
from 1995-2011. 
1 The latest Standard Eurobarometer 75 (Eurobarometer, 2011) finds that the freedom to travel, study 
and work anywhere in the EU and the euro represent the two most important identifying criteria of 
the EU for German citizens. A decrease in support for the euro by Europeans and Germans would 
thus be a worrying trend for the process of European integration.  
2 For an econometric analysis, see Roth, Jonung & Nowak-Lehmann, 2011. 
3 See Gros & Roth, 2009, 2010; Roth, 2009; and Roth, Gros & Nowak-Lehmann, 2011. 
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support for the euro. Third, we compare the findings of the surveys of the Allensbach 
Institute concerning trust in the euro with the trend in support for the euro from the 
Eurobarometer surveys, and put forward explanations as to why the results differ so 
significantly, and why the institute has found such high levels of mistrust.  Fourth, drawing 
upon the results from the last Standard Eurobarometer (EB)75 (Eurobarometer, 2011), the 
paper provides evidence that a majority of German citizens favours deeper European 
economic integration. Fifth, the paper concludes and offers some tentative policy 
conclusions.  
1.  Measuring public support for the single currency  
We draw our measure of public support for the euro from data on responses to 
Eurobarometer surveys carried out bi-annually between October 1990 (EB34) and spring 
2011 (EB75). Eurobarometer surveys are normally administered in Germany to 1,500 (before 
EB62) or 2,000 respondents (from EB62 onwards), in face-to-face interviews in the 
respondents’ homes. For each Standard Eurobarometer survey, new and independent 
population samples are composed. During our chosen time period (1990-2011), the basic 
sampling design in all member states is multi-stage and random (probability), guaranteeing 
a representative polling of the entire population. Although the Eurobarometer surveys 
started in 1973, the question relating to European Monetary Union and the euro was first 
introduced in October 1990 (EB34). To measure public support for the euro we analyse the 
responses to the following survey question: 
What is your opinion on each of the following proposals? Please state for each 
proposal whether you are for it or against it.  
The “proposal” that concerns us in this paper is then presented as: “A European Monetary 
Union with one single currency, the euro”.4 
The respondent can then answer by using the following alternatives: “for”, “against”, “don’t 
know”. 
This type of question is standard in public opinion polls and the results have been widely 
used in the academic literature on public attitudes towards the single currency (see 
Kaltenthaler & Anderson, 2001; Banducci et al., 2003 & 2009; and Kaelberer, 2007, for 
example). As the response rate of the “Don’t know” answer from German respondents 
fluctuates significantly (with a low of 3% in the year 2008 and a high of 36% in 1990 and 
                                                      
4 This question has been modified slightly over the 21-year period of our study. The wording of 
Standard Eurobarometers EB34-37 (autumn 1990 – spring 1992) was “Within this European Economic 
and Monetary Union, a single common currency replacing the different currencies of the Member 
States in five or six years time”. The wording of the question from EB38-40 (1992-1993) was: “There 
s h o u l d  b e  a  E u r o p e a n  M o n e t a r y  U n i o n  w i t h  o n e  single currency replacing by 1999 the (national 
currency) and all other national currencies of the Member States of the European Community”. After 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the wording in EB41 was changed to: “(…) Member States of 
the European Union and European Community”. From EB42 onwards, the term “European 
Community” was dropped. From EB44 onwards, the “by 1999” was dropped. From EB46 onwards, 
the wording “euro” is introduced and the wording “European Monetary Union” is dropped. From 
EB48 onwards the wording “should” is replaced with “has”. From EB54 the wording “replacing the 
(national currency) and all other national currencies” is dropped. From EB54 onwards the wording 
“European Monetary Union” is reintroduced. From EB56 to EB72 onwards the wording “There has to 
be” is dropped, which now represents the wording as highlighted within the text. From EB73 onwards 
the wording “European Monetary Union” was replaced with “Economic and Monetary Union”. As it 
is unlikely that these changes in the framing of the question over time are responsible for any 
significant variation for our purposes, we ignore these modifications to the survey question. A similar 
line of argument is used by Banducci et al., 2003, p. 690. DO GERMANS SUPPORT THE EURO? | 3 
 
 
1991), we focus on net support measured as the number of “for” responses minus the 
number of “against” responses to the above question for our descriptive analysis. Figure 1 
shows the aggregated trend of citizens’ support in Germany in comparison to citizens’ 
support for the euro in an EA-12 country sample for the 1990-2011 period. 
Figure 1. Comparison between Germany and EA-12 countries of net support, 1990-2011 
 
Notes: Net support levels of above 0 indicate that a majority of citizens supports the euro. The 
aggregated figure for the 12 countries from the euro area (EA-12) applies population weights. 
The countries include Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, 
Finland, Portugal, Ireland, Luxembourg and Greece. EA-12 is based upon approximately 
500,000 individual observations. For more information on the data from the EA-12 country 
sample, see Roth, Jonung & Nowak-Lehmann D. (2011). 
Four periods within the overall 21-year timeframe can be identified. Before the start of the 
European Monetary Union on 1 January 1999 (1st period), net support levels in Germany in 
autumn 1990 showed a clear majority of German citizens supporting the idea of a common 
currency (with a net support value of +26%). From 1990 until 1993, trust fell significantly to a 
net trust value of far below 0 in spring 1993. Some authors have argued that this decline was 
due to the EMS crisis after the unification of Germany (Banducci et al., 2003, pp. 693-694). 
Thus, for the five-year time period (from autumn 1992 to autumn 1997), a majority of 
German citizens did not support the euro. From autumn 1997 until autumn 1998, there was a 
rapid increase in support, and in autumn 1998, after a long period of very low support, a 
majority of Germans appeared to support the euro. When the monetary union started with 
the euro, initially only as a book-keeping entity in January 1999 (2nd period), interestingly, 
support for the euro fell by more than 20 percentage points – to essentially zero in the 
autumn of 2000. This drop is widely linked to the decline of the euro in value vis-à-vis the US 
dollar (Banducci et al., 2003 & 2009, p. 566; and Hobolt & Leblond, 2009). 
But once the physical euro entered into circulation on 1 January 2002 (3rd period), the net 
support increased by 15 percentage points from 28% to up to 43% and from autumn 2003 
onwards, it remained at an average level of around 36% (with a standard deviation of 9%; 
6% from spring 2008 onwards) until spring 2011. In the direct aftermath of the financial 
crisis, support for the euro even increased slightly from spring 2008 to autumn 2008. After a 
significant decrease during the crisis period until spring 2010, in the midst of the sovereign 
debt crisis, it increased again to 39% in autumn 2010 to decrease to 31% in spring 2011.  
Figure 1 illustrates that the financial and sovereign debt crisis has not dramatically reduced 
German citizens’ support for the euro – at least not so far, and that since the introduction of 
the euro coins and banknotes in January 2002, a majority of German citizens has supported 
the euro up to now. 
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Table 1. Changes in Germans’ net trust in national and European institutions in comparison to net 
support for the euro 
Comparison  Spring 2008  Spring 2011  Spring 2011 - Spring 2008 
Net trust ECB  36 8  -28 
Net trust EU   -1 -20  -19 
Net trust EP  18 1  -17 
Net trust EC   7 -9  -16 
Net support EURO   41  31 -10 
Net Trust NG   -21 -15  6 
Net Trust NP  -11 -2  9 
Notes: ECB= European Central Bank; EU=European Union; EP= European Parliament; EC= European 
Commission; NG= National Government; NP= National Parliament. 
Source: Data from Standard EB69-75 (2008-2011). 
3.  Net support for the euro versus trust in the euro 
Figure 3 compares the data from our ‘support’ item from the Eurobarometer surveys with 
the available data from the Allensbach Institute on ‘trust’ in the euro. To highlight the 
striking difference between the published results from the Allensbach Institute, as reported 
in newspaper articles by Köcher (2011a & b), Petersen (2011) and Ankenbrand & 
Siedenbiedel (2011), and the results based on Eurobarometer data, we have constructed a net 
trust measure for the Allensbach data for the whole time period of 1995 to 2011 by 
subtracting the sum of the response “less trust” and “no trust at all” from the sum “great 
trust” and “very great trust”. From June 2001 onwards, however, this is methodologically 
problematic and inadequate.5 The Allensbach Institute (2007) and two newspaper articles by 
Petersen (2011) on 26 January 2011 and Köcher on 19 October (2011a), add the two response 
categories “less trust” and “no trust at all” and compare it to the response rate “great trust”. 
As can be inferred from Table A1, Petersen assumes that that the two response rates “great 
                                                      
5 According to the Allensbach Institute (2001) and Allensbach data on trust in the euro given to the 
authors by Dr. Petersen, from October 1995 until February/March 2001, Allensbach data consist of a 
scale with five possible responses varying from “no trust at all”, “less trust”, “great trust”, “very great 
trust” and “undecided”. According to the same sources and Köcher (2010), from June 2001 onwards, 
the trust item is only based on a scale with four response possibilities: “no trust at all”, “less trust”, 
“great trust” and “undecided”. Thus the response “very great trust” is now missing. The reason for 
dropping the response “very great trust” has most likely been the fact that the response rate of “very 
great trust” was very small (from 2-4% from 1995-2001 and reached 0% (as reported by Dr. Petersen to 
the authors) in June 2001. As the scaling changes from 2001-02, two conclusions may be drawn. First, 
comparing data before 2002 with data from 2002 onwards seems to be empirically problematic as the 
trust items compared do not have the same scale. However, this is done by Petersen (2011) as can be 
seen in Table A1 in the Appendix. Second, adding the two negative responses “no trust at all” with 
“less trust” and comparing them with the one positive response “great trust” seems to be empirically 
problematic. Whereas Köcher (2010) still describes all three trends – “great trust”, “less trust” and “no 
trust at all” (see here Figure A1 in the Appendix) – Petersen (2011) and Köcher (2011a & b) already 
start to add the two negative responses and compare it to the one positive response. This can be seen 
in Table A1 in the Appendix and becomes obvious in the newspaper article “Schicksalsthema Europa” 
by Köcher (2011a) on 19 October 2011, where she states that three-quarters of Germans mistrust (in the 
original article it is called “ein Misstrauensvotum abgeben”) the euro, in comparison to 17%, who still 
trust the euro.  6 |GROS & ROTH 
trust” and “very great trust” from 1995 to June 2001 can be compared to the single response 
rate “great trust” without the need for significant clarification or empirical discussion. 
Whereas the Allensbach data indicate that a majority of citizens has distrusted the euro from 
October 1995 to 2011 in almost all time periods, the Eurobarometer surveys show that since 
the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999, a clear majority of German citizens has 
supported the single European currency, the euro. The trend figures have in particular 
drifted apart since the start of the financial and sovereign debt crisis, from 2008 onwards. In 
May/June 2011, according to Allensbach, trust trend data reached a level of -52% (19% trust 
and 71% mistrust) (Ankenbrand & Seidenbiedel, 2011 and data given to the authors by Dr. 
Petersen). The support for the euro data changed only slightly and remained at +31% in May 
2011. The difference between the Allensbach data on trust and the Eurobarometer item on 
support in May 2011 is startling. The difference is net value terms is 83%.6 
Figure 3. Trends of net support for the euro based on EB data and net trust in the euro  
 
Notes: Eurobarometer data are based upon approximately 55,00 individual observations. EB data from 1995-
2009 were purchased by TNS EMNID. EB data from 2009-2011 were extracted from the European 
Commission website. In order to match EB data with Allensbach, data from EB 44, EB 46 , EB 47, EB 
50, EB 53, EB 55, EB 56, EB 58, EB 59 EB 62, EB 63, EB 67, EB 70 , EB 72, EB 73, EB 74, EB 75 
were taken.  The time difference between the Allensbach and Eurobarometer data is nowhere greater than 
three months. Allensbach data have been provided to the authors by Dr. Petersen. Not all Allensbach 
observations could be utilised; only those which could adequately be linked to our Eurobarometer data. 
As can be seen in Figure A2 in the Appendix, the difference is less startling for the time trend 
of the question whether German citizens would like to have back their old currency. This 
question actually indicates that, despite the crisis, fewer and fewer Germans want to have 
                                                      
6 Moreover, Petersen (2011) argues in his article that there was only one year – 2002, when the euro 
went first into circulation – when a majority of German citizens trusted the euro. He claims that in all 
other time periods German citizens mistrusted the euro.  As can be seen in Figure A1 this argument 
does not hold when analysing the information on trust in the year 2009. Following the logic of 
Petersen (who combines “less trust” with “no trust at all”), there would have been a majority of 
citizens who trusted the euro in 2009. However, as Table A1 clarifies, most curiously, in presenting his 
line of argument, Petersen has not taken the data point from 2009 into consideration, but jumps from 
an observation from October 2008 to November 2010. It is only by excluding the data point from 2009 
that Petersen was able to claim that German citizens have consistently mistrusted the euro from 2003 
onwards.  
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the Deutsche Mark (DM) back. However, the net values of 0 for/against the DM are still far 
below the values of the Eurobarometer survey on support for the euro. The two different 
sources of Allensbach data, however, already make clear that the loss of net trust in the euro 
does not imply that more Germans would like to have the DM back. The response to two 
additional questions asked by Allensbach (Allensbach Institute, 2011a) suggests that German 
public opinion remains nuanced: a majority of Germans believes that the exclusion of Greece 
would be the wrong decision (net value of +4%) and the founding of a hard eurozone 
together with France is considered by a majority of German citizens (45%) to be a bad 
solution and only 23% responding that it would be a good solution).  
The puzzling question is now: why is the difference so significant between trust in and 
support for the euro? Two arguments can be put forward.  
First, as one measure concerns “support” and the other concerns “trust”, the two measures 
should be compared with caution.7 The question now, however, is which measure is more 
informative: “trust” in the euro or “support” for the euro? “Trust” in the euro should be 
interpreted as “trust” in the currency (see Kaelberer, 2007, pp. 625-26) in circulation, which 
would be comparable to trust in the Deutsche Mark, and involves a belief that the money can 
be reused for future transactions wielding the same purchasing power (value). Along these 
lines, Kaelberer (2007) calls inflation “the most important enemy of trust” (Kaelberer, 2007, p. 
626). Support for the euro would most likely imply that although having lost trust in money 
in general, citizens might still support the new single currency, the euro, due to the fact that 
citizens believe the European level is better able to mitigate the negative consequences of the 
economic situation compared to the national level.8 The support for the euro would then 
indicate that citizens are willing to “transfer power from the nation state to European 
institutions” (Kaltenthaler et al., 2001, p. 141). In addition, the question is not only directed 
towards the euro but also towards the European Monetary Union, the question being “Are 
you for or against a European Monetary Union with a single currency, the euro?” Thus, whereas 
the “trust” item seems to be appropriate to capture the theoretically profound concept of 
institutional trust, such as trust in the ECB, the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, the national government,  the national parliament, a “support” item for the 
concept of the euro and the EMU is most likely a better measure than a “trust” item to clearly 
distinguish between the euro as being the European single currency (including the transfer to 
European institutions) and money in general.  
Second, the outcome might be due to the i) quality of the data and ii) the scaling of the item 
or iii) the framing of the survey questions.  
i) To test whether the quality of data differs, we conducted three validity tests aiming to 
compare the same items at the same time period on i) trust in the EU, ii) benefit of EU 
membership and iii) trust in the ECB between the Allensbach and Eurobarometer data.9 Most 
astonishingly, the Allensbach data are always lower than the Eurobarometer data (Figures 
A3, A4, A5). As can be inferred from Figure A3 (the longest comparable time trend) it seems 
                                                      
7 For a more detailed elaboration of the difference between a “trust” and “support” item, see also 
Luhmann 2000, p. 70. One should note that the most recent literature in the field does not reflect an 
awareness of the distinction between “trust” in and “support” for the euro. To proxy trust in the euro, 
Kaelberer (2007) uses the support item from the Eurobarometer (Kaelberer, 2007, p. 630). Kaltenthaler 
& Anderson (2001) use the terms public confidence and support as interchangeable concepts (2001, p. 
140). 
8 This is indicated by the fact that a majority of German citizens thinks that the financial and economic 
crisis is better overcome at the European level (Eurobarometer 75). 
9 We have to admit that matching the time periods could lead to some uncertainty because the precise 
month of the Allensbach data on trust in the EU and ECB was not stated. 8 |GROS & ROTH 
that in the spring of 2002 and autumn 2005 the two trends still overlap closely, but from 
autumn 2007 onwards Allensbach data report lower trust values than Eurobarometer data. 
These results are puzzling and deserve attention in future research. For now we conclude 
that the quality of the data varies. Which dataset if of lesser quality is unknown. Both sets of 
data have been gathered via face-to-face interviews.  
ii) The argument concerning the scale used to measure trust in the euro seems to be more 
important, however. From June 2001 onwards (Allensbach Institute, 2007 and data given to 
the authors by Dr. Petersen), it seems that the Allensbach Institute  shifted its scale from a 
scale with five responses “no trust at all”, “less trust”, “undecided”, “great trust”, “very 
great trust” (which has been used from 1995- February/March 2001 to a scale with four 
responses: “no trust at all”, “less trust”, “undecided” and “great trust”.10  
Taking this scale into consideration, it is a questionable move to combine the two responses 
“no trust at all” and “less trust” and then compare it with great trust (as has been done in 
Köcher, 2011a & b; Petersen, 2011; and Ankenbrand & Siedenbiedel, 2011). Combining these 
two response rates to form the new indicator “mistrust” imparts a bias towards the finding 
that a majority of citizens will most likely mistrust the euro – at least in the sense that the 
design of the scale makes the finding likely that a majority does not have “great trust” in the 
euro. Thus, after combining the two responses, Ankenbrand & Seidenbiedel (2011) write that 
71% mistrust the euro (against 19% who trust the euro and three-quarters of the German 
population mistrust the euro (Köcher, 2011a) (with 17% still affirming trust). 
More significantly, the response rate “less trust” might indicate that although there is less 
trust, there is still some trust. Based on the Allensbach logic of combining two responses to 
form the new indicator “mistrust”, another provocative interpretation could be to identify 
the response “less trust” as being some trust, and construct a new trust indicator consisting 
of “some trust” and “great trust”. This new trust indicator could then be compared to “no 
trust at all”. As this approach will have an upward bias, a second approach is just not to 
count “less trust” and construct a net measure between the response “great trust” and “no 
trust at all” (for an overview of the three trust trend categories, see Figure A6 in the 
appendix). In Figure 4, we analyse the trend graphs of both alternative specifications and, as 
assumed, the difference between Eurobarometer data and Allensbach data is less marked. 
Whereas our first alternative specification (adding “less trust” to “greater trust” and 
subtracting “no trust at all”) now provides higher levels of trust than support levels (net 
trust of + 44%), the second alternative specification (not considering “less trust”) is still lower 
than our support data from the Eurobarometer, but the difference is less significant. Our 
second specification renders a net trust level of -4% instead of -52%. This specification makes 
clear that there has been a net trust decline due to the sovereign debt crisis of 36% (from +32 
to -4) but not by 53% (from +1 to minus 52). In particular the value of -4% makes clear that it 
is only a small minority that mistrusts the euro. The net value of -4% would also be a closer 
approximation to the TNS Infratest data (DPA 2011a), which found a -3% of net trust (30% 
trust vs. 33% mistrust the euro). Thus, the second alternative specification indicates that 
there has certainly been a significant decline in trust, but a far less dramatic decrease than the 
Allensbach findings have implied.  
                                                      
10 The original terms in German are „sehr grosses Vertrauen”, „grosses Vertrauen“, 
„Unentschieden“,“ weniger Vertrauen“, „kaum, gar kein Vertrauen“. DO GERMANS SUPPORT THE EURO? | 9 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of alternative trends of Allensbach data with Eurobarometer data 
 
Note: Standard EBs 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 63, 67, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, and data given to the author by Dr. 
Petersen. 
iii) Framing. One important difference between the Eurobarometer and the Allensbach 
surveys is the context: the Eurobarometer survey puts the context of the question into 
Europe since many (but by no means at all) questions concern Europe, European integration 
and the European institutions. The respondents might thus ‘frame’ their answers in a 
different way from when they are interviewed during an Allensbach survey, which has a 
purely national context. For instance, the difference in the data as depicted in Figures A3-A5 
in the Appendix might be related to the framing effect.  
4.  General support for European integration among German citizens 
We may summarise our findings by saying that a majority of citizens still supports the euro 
and EMU, but only a small minority has ‘great trust’ in the common currency.  
But what is the overall position of Germans towards European integration? We found that 
trust in the EU institutions remains slightly higher than in the corresponding national 
institutions (see Table 1). 
And there are more indicators to show that a majority of German citizens remains in favour 
of deeper economic and European integration. Even in 2011, a majority of German citizens 
(net value of +18%) remains optimistic about the future of the EU. A majority thinks that the 
EU is better able to tackle effective actions against the financial and economic crisis than the 
national government (net value of 20% vs. 17%). An overwhelming majority (net value of 
88%) agrees that the EU member states should work together to tackle the financial and 
economic crisis. A majority (net value of +68%) of German citizens thinks that a stronger 
coordination of economic policy among all EU member states is effective. A majority of 
German citizens (net value of +70%) thinks that a stronger coordination of economic and 
financial policies among the countries of the euro area would be effective to overcome the 
current financial crisis. A majority of German citizens (net value of 38%) thinks that EU 
membership is a good thing for Germany. A majority (net values of 49% and 65%) of citizens 
wants a common foreign policy and common defence and security policy. A majority of 
citizens thinks that Germany has benefited from the EU (net value of +6%) and a majority 
(+7 net value) of German citizens agrees that the interests of Germany are well taken into 
account in the EU. In addition, German citizens think that European Monetary Policy should 
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be emphasised by the European institutions to strengthen the EU in the next five years (with 
45% the second most important item after energy policy). However, one has to admit that 
German citizens believe that the national government has been more effective in combating 
the crisis so far (45% vs. 46% for the EU and 66% vs. 29% for the national government). This 
would be in accordance with the increase of net trust in the national government and 
parliament, as depicted in Table 1. 
5.  Conclusion 
Our analysis has shown that even in the midst of the ‘euro’ debt crisis, more German citizens 
support the euro (63%) than do not (only 32%). In addition, since the introduction of the euro 
in January 1999, a majority of German citizens has always supported the euro and monetary 
union, and the percentage of those hankering for a return to the DM continues to decline.  
Our findings suggest the dramatic fall in trust in the euro as depicted by the Allensbach 
Institute will most likely concern trust in money in general, but does not necessarily mean a 
loss of German support for the euro as the centrepiece of European integration – the 
(Economic) and European Monetary Union.  
Secondly, although there is undoubtedly a significant fall in trust in the euro, the dramatic 
fall as inferred by the institute for public opinion, Allensbach, is most likely due to an 
erroneous interpretation of the underlying scale. Alternative interpretations of the data show 
that the decline in trust in the euro is not so dramatic, but in fact it corresponds more closely 
to the support data of Eurobarometer.  
Thirdly, in contrast to the high approval rating for the euro, we detect a significant fall in 
approval for the ECB; German citizens thus seem to blame the governance structure behind 
the euro but not the EMU and the euro itself. Eurobarometer data also indicate that German 
citizens are clearly in favour of deeper political integration.  
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Trust trends as depicted in Allensbach Institute (2010) 
 
Source: Allensbach Institute (2010). 
 
Table A1. Trust in the euro (among the German population age 16 and over) 
FRAGE:  “Wie viel Vertrauen haben Sie zu der gemeinsamen europäischen Währung? 
Würden Sie sagen ...” (Question: How much trust do you have in the common European 
currency? Would you say…) 
 All  population 
 Very  great/ 
great trust (%) 
Less trust/ 
no trust at all (%) 
Undecided (%) 
1995, October  22  69  9 
1996,  December  21 66 13 
1997, July / August  23  68  9 
1998,  June  25 64 11 
1999,  January  37 50 13 
2000, May / June  21  71  8 
2001, June  15  76  9 
2002,  January  49 40 11 
2003,  April  29 60 11 
2004,  December  33 57 10 
2005, July  27  65  8 
2007,  February  31 57 12 
2008,  October  41 46 13 
2010, November  26  65  9 
2011,  January  22 68 10 
Source: Allensbach Institute (2011a) (translation by author). 14 |GROS & ROTH 
Figure A2. Do Germans want the Deutsche Mark back? 
 
Source: Allensbach Institute (2011b).  
 
Figure A3. Comparison between trends in net trust in the EU – Eurobarometer vs. Allensbach data, 
2002-10  
 
Sources: Standard EB 57, the mean of EB 63 and 64, the mean of EB 67 and 68, EB 73, EB 74 and 
Allensbach Institute (2011a). 
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Figure A4. Benefit from EU membership, comparison of Allensbach and Eurobarometer data, 2011 
 
Sources: Standard EB 75 and Allensbach Institute (2011a). 
 
Figure A5. Comparison between trends in net trust in the ECB – Eurobarometer vs. Allensbach data, 
2002-10  
 
Sources: Standard EB’s 57, 60, 73 and Allensbach Institute (2010). 
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Figure A6. Comparison of three response categories with Allensbach trust data, 
June 2001-November 2011 
 
Source: Data provided to the authors by Dr. Petersen, Allensbach Institute. 
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